Less Than Zero Tolerance

The next subsection concerns financial support for the plaintiff.  The final order can, at least temporarily, require that defendants support whomever they have “a duty to support.” Essentially, this prevents a defendant from completely cutting off financial support.  The plaintiff must file a complaint for support within two weeks of the court issuing the final PFA order to have support continue. Oddly, there is nothing here concerning temporary orders, making it clear that this type of relief can only be in an order after the hearing.

1. 1. (5)  After a hearing in accordance with section 6107(a), directing the defendant to pay financial support to those persons the defendant has a duty to support, requiring the defendant, under sections 4324 (relating to inclusion of medical support) and 4326 (relating to mandatory inclusion of child medical support), to provide health coverage for the minor child and spouse, directing the defendant to pay all of the unreimbursed medical expenses of a spouse or minor child of the defendant to the provider or to the plaintiff when he or she has paid for the medical treatment, and directing the defendant to make or continue to make rent or mortgage payments on the residence of the plaintiff to the extent that the defendant has a duty to support the plaintiff or other dependent household members. The support order shall be temporary, and any beneficiary of the order must file a complaint for support under the provisions of Chapters 43 (relating to support matters generally) and 45 (relating to reciprocal enforcement of support orders) within two weeks of the date of the issuance of the protection order. If a complaint for support is not filed, that portion of the protection order requiring the defendant to pay support is void. When there is a subsequent ruling on a complaint for support, the portion of the protection order requiring the defendant to pay support expires.

Subsection (6) states that the order can prohibit the defendant from contacting the plaintiff or minor children.  I’m not sure how the legislature intended to use the word contact here; their wording suggests physical contact can be prohibited, requiring the defendant to avoid being near the plaintiff.  Oddly, this subsection also states that the order can restrain the plaintiff from harassing the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s family.  While this type of requirement seems natural for a restraining order, harassment is already a crime.  However, having this in a court order makes it much easier to convict someone for harassment and give much harsher punishments.


The petitioner will likely supply a lengthy list of people to the judge when requesting an emergency or temporary order. In my case, the court included my children, Rita’s sister, and her mother, even though there were no allegations that I had ever done anything to threaten or harm them.

Subsection (7) is another lengthy section dealing with firearms, and I include it here only for completeness.

1. 1. (6)  Prohibiting the defendant from having any contact with the plaintiff or minor children, including, but not limited to, restraining the defendant from entering the place of employment or business or school of the plaintiff or minor children and from harassing the plaintiff or plaintiff’s relatives or minor children.
   2. (7)  Prohibiting the defendant from acquiring or possessing any firearm for the duration of the order, ordering the defendant to temporarily relinquish to the sheriff or the appropriate law enforcement agency any firearms under the defendant’s possession or control, and requiring the defendant to relinquish to the sheriff or the appropriate law enforcement agency any firearm license issued under section 6108.3 (relating to relinquishment to third party for safekeeping) or 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106 (relating to firearms not to be carried without a license) or 6109 (relating to licenses) the defendant may possess. The court may also order the defendant to relinquish the defendant’s other weapons or ammunition that have been used or been threatened to be used in an incident of abuse against the plaintiff or the minor children. A copy of the court’s order shall be transmitted to the chief or head of the appropriate law enforcement agency and to the sheriff of the county of which the defendant is a resident. When relinquishment is ordered, the following shall apply:
      1. (i)  (A)  The court’s order shall require the defendant to relinquish such firearms, other weapons, ammunition and any firearm license pursuant to the provisions of this chapter within 24 hours of service of a temporary order or the entry of a final order or the close of the next business day as necessary by closure of the sheriffs’ offices, except for cause shown at the hearing, in which case the court shall specify the time for relinquishment of any or all of the defendant’s firearms.
         1. (B)  A defendant subject to a temporary order requiring the relinquishment of firearms, other weapons or ammunition shall, in lieu of relinquishing specific firearms, other weapons or ammunition which cannot reasonably be retrieved within the time for relinquishment in clause (A) due to their current location, provide the sheriff or the appropriate law enforcement agency with an affidavit listing the firearms, other weapons or ammunition and their current location. If the defendant, within the time for relinquishment in clause (A), fails to provide the affidavit or fails to relinquish, pursuant to this chapter, any firearms, other weapons or ammunition ordered to be relinquished which are not specified in the affidavit, the sheriff or the appropriate law enforcement agency shall, at a minimum, provide immediate notice to the court, the plaintiff and appropriate law enforcement authorities. The defendant shall not possess any firearms, other weapons or ammunition specifically listed in the affidavit provided to the sheriff or the appropriate law enforcement agency pursuant to this clause for the duration of the temporary order.
         2. (C)  As used in this subparagraph, the term “cause” shall be limited to facts relating to the inability of the defendant to retrieve a specific firearm within 24 hours due to the current location of the firearm.
      2. (ii)  The court’s order shall contain a list of any firearm, other weapon or ammunition ordered relinquished. Upon the entry of a final order, the defendant shall inform the court in what manner the defendant is going to relinquish any firearm, other weapon or ammunition ordered relinquished. Relinquishment may occur pursuant to section 6108.2 (relating to relinquishment for consignment sale, lawful transfer or safekeeping) or 6108.3 or to the sheriff or the appropriate law enforcement agency pursuant to this paragraph. Where the sheriff or the appropriate law enforcement agency is designated, the sheriff or the appropriate law enforcement agency shall secure custody of the defendant’s firearms, other weapons or ammunition and any firearm license listed in the court’s order for the duration of the order or until otherwise directed by court order. In securing custody of the defendant’s relinquished firearms, the sheriff or the appropriate law enforcement agency shall comply with 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(f)(4) (relating to persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms). In securing custody of the defendant’s other weapons and ammunition, the sheriff or the appropriate law enforcement agency shall provide the defendant with a signed and dated written receipt which shall include a detailed description of the other weapon or ammunition and its condition. The court shall inform the defendant that firearms, other weapons or ammunition shall be deemed abandoned when the conditions under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6128(a) (relating to abandonment of firearms, weapons or ammunition) are satisfied and may then be disposed of in accordance with 18 Pa.C.S. § 6128.
      3. (iii)  The sheriff or the appropriate law enforcement agency shall provide the plaintiff with the name of the person to which any firearm, other weapon or ammunition was relinquished.
      4. (iv)  Unless the defendant has complied with subparagraph (i)(B) or section 6108.2 or 6108.3, if the defendant fails to relinquish any firearm, other weapon, ammunition or firearm license within 24 hours or upon the close of the next business day due to closure of sheriffs’ or appropriate law enforcement agencies’ offices or within the time ordered by the court upon cause being shown at the hearing, the sheriff or the appropriate law enforcement agency shall, at a minimum, provide immediate notice to the court, the plaintiff and appropriate law enforcement agencies, as appropriate.
      5. (v)  Any portion of any order or any petition or other paper which includes a list of any firearm, other weapon or ammunition ordered relinquished shall be kept in the files of the court as a permanent record thereof and withheld from public inspection except:
         1. (A)  upon an order of the court granted upon cause shown;
         2. (B)  as necessary, by law enforcement and court personnel; or
         3. (C)  after redaction of information listing any firearm, other weapon or ammunition.
      6. (vi)  As used in this paragraph, the term “defendant’s firearms” shall, if the defendant is a licensed firearms dealer, only include firearms in the defendant’s personal firearms collection pursuant to 27 CFR § 478.125a (relating to personal firearms collection).
   3. (7.1)  If the defendant is a licensed firearms dealer, ordering the defendant to follow such restrictions as the court may require concerning the conduct of his business, which may include ordering the defendant to relinquish any Federal or State license for the sale, manufacture or importation of firearms as well as firearms in the defendant’s business inventory. In restricting the defendant pursuant to this paragraph, the court shall make a reasonable effort to preserve the financial assets of the defendant’s business while fulfilling the goals of this chapter.

The next subsection addresses reimbursing the plaintiff for “reasonable losses suffered as a result of the abuse.” Anything the plaintiff can claim as financial losses, the court can order the defendant to reimburse.  In my case, the emergency and temporary orders that I suspect Rita’s attorney wrote stated that I was to pay for Rita’s attorney’s fees and reimburse her for “loss of work” and the cost of lock changes.  The final order included none of this; I suspect Judge Ruest read the final order before signing it.

1. 1. (8)  Directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff for reasonable losses suffered as a result of the abuse, including medical, dental, relocation and moving expenses; counseling; loss of earnings or support; costs of repair or replacement of real or personal property damaged, destroyed or taken by the defendant or at the direction of the defendant; and other out-of-pocket losses for injuries sustained. In addition to out-of-pocket losses, the court may direct the defendant to pay reasonable attorney fees. An award under this chapter shall not constitute a bar to litigation for civil damages for injuries sustained from the acts of abuse giving rise to the award or a finding of contempt under this chapter.

Subsection (9) seems pretty straightforward, but I wonder why it’s near the end of the list and if the legislature added it after The Act became law. It is also not clear why an order would specifically preclude someone from doing something that is against the law anyway. Again, I suspect the legislature added this to provide district attorneys the option of charging an alleged abuser with a PFA violation.  A PFA violation is much easier to prosecute–with defendants having far fewer rights–and takes much fewer resources from the district attorney’s office than a prosecution for harassment or stalking, for which the penalty will likely be less severe.

1. 1. (9)  Directing the defendant to refrain from stalking or harassing the plaintiff and other designated persons as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2709 (relating to harassment) and 2709.1 (relating to stalking).
   2. (10)  Granting any other appropriate relief sought by the plaintiff.

The last subsection is the most problematic for the defendant and allows judges to put anything in the order they want, which they seem to do regardless of whether a plaintiff requests it.  One could undoubtedly challenge this by asking for evidence that the plaintiff made the request.  The problem is that, unless you’re willing to make many appeals, having something overturned on a technicality is very difficult.  If you appeal the order, the judge would ask the plaintiff if they want the provision in the order at the appeal hearing.  If, on the other hand, you violate a provision allegedly requested by the plaintiff, the judge presiding over the hearing, i.e., the one that issued the order, is not going to care if the plaintiff asked for the violated provision.  You could appeal this decision, but the appeals court would say The Act doesn’t require there to be any record of the request.

An example of “other appropriate relief,” and one that appears in all orders I’ve seen, is the following statement.

• Defendant may not post any remark(s) regarding Plaintiff on any social network(s), including, but not limited to, Facebook, Myspace, Twitter, or any other electronic network(s).

Judges have recently expanded this to read, “Defendant may not post any remark(s) regarding or image(s) concerning or portraying…” Courts include this clause to prevent the defendant from harassing someone via social networks. The court likely added the final clause as a catchall for any other “electronic network” that one could use to post remarks or images such as Instagram.  However, by including all electronic networks and taking a loose definition of “post,” this provision is very prohibitive.  For example, it prohibits defendants from making any remark concerning the accuser in, for example, email (even to their lawyer) or on the telephone.  Because orders typically also prohibit third-party contact, a PFA violation occurs in Centre County every time a defendant files a petition pro se that mentions the accuser because the prothonotary will post the petition on their website.

An apparent addendum to subsection (a) makes it clear that a final order must “direct the defendant to refrain from abusing, harassing, stalking, threatening or attempting or threatening to use physical force against the plaintiff or minor children” as well as deal with weapons the defendant may possess.  However, a final agreement may order the defendant to refrain from the same acts.  The difference between an order and an agreement is that an agreement does not require a hearing.  I believe my order was an agreement, i.e., an agreed-upon order. It’s not clear when why the legislature added this subsection or why it is even necessary.  In practice, the distinction between an order and an agreement seems to be effectively irrelevant.

1. (a.1)  Final order or agreement.–The following apply:
   1. (1)  Any final order must direct the defendant to refrain from abusing, harassing, stalking, threatening or attempting or threatening to use physical force against the plaintiff or minor children and must order that the defendant is subject to the firearms, other weapons or ammunition and firearms license prohibition relinquishment provisions under subsection (a)(7).
   2. (2)  A final agreement may direct the defendant to refrain from abusing, harassing, stalking, threatening or attempting or threatening to use physical force against the plaintiff or minor children and may order that the defendant is subject to the firearms, other weapons or ammunition and firearms license prohibition and relinquishment provisions under subsection (a)(7).